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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1959
infamous. Presentment or indictment by a grand jury is necessary.
Thus, prosecution in any other manner is unauthorized, a nullity, and
a court purporting to entertain it is without jurisdiction over the of-
fense. Any ordinance on the subject which is in conflict with the
statute is invalid.
The court had difficulty in distinguishing the earlier case of Pil-
lage of Struthers v. Sokol,34 but concluded that the test therein set
forth for determining conflict, that an ordinance is invalid which
"permits or licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits, and
vice versa,"3 5 is not exclusive.
SAMUEL SONENFIELD
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
PROMISE MUST BE UNCONDITIONAL
Ohio Revised Code section 1301.03 (B) 1 requires that an instru-
ment, to be negotiable, must contain an unconditional promise or
order to pay a sum certain in money. Ohio Revised Code section
2309.32 permits the so-called "short form of pleading" in an action
upon an instrument for the unconditional payment of money only.
In Smith v. Shoemaker,' involving the above "short form of
pleading" statute, the court held that an instrument designated by
the parties as a note, but providing for "payments only when pos-
sible," was not an instrument for the unconditional payment of
money.3 The opinion is especially valuable because of the discussion
and the citation of authorities.
Obviously, if the above words make the promise conditional un-
der the pleading statute, it is likewise conditional under the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law, and thus the instrument is not negotiable.
DISCHARGE: PRINCIPAL DEBTOR BECOMES HOLDER
Ohio Revised Code section 1303.34 (E) 4 provides that an instru-
ment is discharged when the principal debtor becomes the holder of
the instrument at or after maturity in his own right.
Gibbons v. Sommers5 is an example of how this statute operates.
Sommers, a co-maker of a note, paid off the note, whereupon the
payee indorsed it to him. Sommers then took a judgment by confes-
sion on the note under a warrant-of-attorney clause. The court held
that under the above section the note was discharged, and that there
34. 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923).
35. Id. at syllabus 2. It is still possible to distinguish the two cases, since in the Sokol case
the statutory penalty, although less than the munidpal one, was not a felony penalty.
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